A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election

Oversight and Review Division 18-04 June 2018

CHAPTER ELEVEN:

COMPLETION OF THE INVESTIGATION

1. The October 30, 2016 Search Warrant

The FBI obtained a search warrant for the Midyear-related material on the Weiner laptop on October 30, 2016. The search warrant authorized the FBI to search for four categories of information on the laptop:

1. Data and information associated with the operation, use, maintenance, backup, auditing, and security functions of the Subject Laptop…;

2. Data and information electronically stored on the Subject Laptop related to communications with email accounts used by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her tenure as Secretary of State;

3. Data and information on the Subject Laptop that might identify the person or persons who accessed classified information present on the Subject Laptop…; and

4. Data and information on the Subject Laptop that might identify activity related to a computer intrusion….

We discuss the Midyear team’s decision to seek a search warrant rather than using consent to review the laptop below. We also discuss the narrow factual basis for the search warrant that the Midyear team included in the application and compare the Weiner laptop with the treatment of other devices during the main part of the Midyear investigation.

1. Decision Not to Seek Consent from Abedin and Weiner before Seeking a Warrant

Prosecutor 1 told us that there was “some discussion” of getting consent

from Weiner and Abedin to search the laptop. However, Prosecutor 1 stated that consent from both was needed and, at that point, the Midyear team’s understanding was that Weiner was inaccessible because he was at a location where he did not have access to electronic devices. Prosecutor 1 continued:

And…there was some concern about [Weiner’s] attorney gladly providing consent but wanting something from SDNY for it. And our horse trading on conduct that was egregious and doing something for purposes of our case didn’t seem to make much sense. I think the decision was made not to seek consent from either attorney and to get a warrant.

Prosecutor 1 told us that he believed both FBI and the Department agreed with the decision to seek a search warrant rather than consent to access the Weiner laptop.

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Baker agreed that they did not want to try to deal with Weiner or his

attorney, but also provided an additional explanation for not seeking consent.

Baker stated:

I think we were concerned about that being too prolonged and dragged [out]. I think that reflects some of our frustration with what had happened previously in the investigation. We’re trying to get consent, and those kinds of discussions were long and drawn out. And we were just like, screw it, we’re not going to deal with that. We’re just going to get a damn search warrant. We’re just not going to, we’re not going to let DOJ take us down that road. We’re just going to get a search warrant…. [A]nd in this case, we’ve got SDNY, and we think they’ll be aggressive and they’ll go get it.

After reviewing a draft of this report, Toscas and other prosecutors noted that SDNY played no substantive role in the October 30 search warrant.

1. Factual Basis of the October 30 Search Warrant Application

The factual basis for the October 30 search warrant application, which was

prepared by the Midyear team, contained limited information about what the NYO

case agent had seen on the Weiner laptop and the importance of that information

to the Midyear investigation. The entirety of the search warrant application that

discussed what had been seen on the Weiner laptop stated:

In executing the search of the laptop computer (the Subject Laptop) pursuant to the search warrant issued on September 26, 2016, FBI agents sorted the emails on the Subject Laptop to segregate emails within the scope of the warrant from those outside of it. As a result, the FBI reviewed non-content header information for emails on the Subject Laptop to facilitate its search. In so doing, the FBI observed non-content header information indicating that thousands of emails of Weiner’s then wife, Huma Abedin (Abedin), resided on the Subject Laptop. Because Abedin’s emails were outside the scope of the September 26 search warrant, the FBI did not review the content of those emails.

…The non-content header information that FBI agents reviewed on the Subject Laptop indicates that the emails on the Subject Laptop include emails sent and/or received by Abedin at her @clintonemail.com account and at a Yahoo! email account appearing to belong to Abedin, as well as correspondence between one or both of these accounts and State Department email accounts during and around Abedin’s tenure at the State Department. The FBI’s investigation of the improper transmission and storage of classified information on unclassified email systems and servers has established that emails containing classified information were transmitted through multiple email accounts used by Abedin, including her @clintonemail.com and Yahoo! email accounts.

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The FBI’s investigation determined that Abedin, using her various email accounts, typically communicated with Clinton’s @clintonemail.com account on a daily basis. Analysis of emails in the FBI’s possession revealed more than 4,000 work-related emails between Abedin and Clinton from 2009 to 2013.

The FBI’s investigation established that 27 email chains containing classified information, as determined by the relevant original classification authorities, have been transmitted through Abedin’s @clintonemail and/or Yahoo! accounts. Out of the 27 email chains, six email chains contained information that was classified at the Secret level at the time the emails were sent, and information in four of those email chains remains classified at that level now, while two email chains contain information that is currently classified at the Confidential level. Information in the remaining 21 email chains was classified at the Confidential level at the time the emails were sent, and of those 21 email chains, information in 16 of them remains classified as Confidential.

Given the information indicating that there are thousands of Abedin’s emails located on the Subject Laptop – including emails, during and around Abedin’s tenure at the State Department, from Abedin’s @clintonemail.com account as well as a Yahoo! account appearing to belong to Abedin – and the regular email correspondence between Abedin and Clinton, there is probable cause to believe that the Subject Laptop contains correspondence between Abedin and Clinton during their time at the State Department. Because it has been determined by relevant original classification authorities that many emails were exchanged between Abedin, using her @clintonemail.com and/or Yahoo! accounts, and Clinton that contain classified information, there is also probable cause to believe that the correspondence between them located on the Subject Laptop contains classified information….

Noticeably absent from the search warrant application prepared by the

Midyear team is both any mention that the NYO agent had seen Clinton’s emails on

the laptop and any mention of the potential presence of BlackBerry emails from

early in Clinton’s tenure. In explaining the absence of this information, Strzok

stated:

I think what we were trying to do was establish as tightly as we could the fact that we believed, because I think the basis of the probable cause was that there was classified information on there…. I think it as that narrative was not designed to tell the whole story. That narrative was to, designed to demonstrate to the magistrate that we have probable cause that there was evidence of a crime on there.

We also asked Prosecutor 1 about the factual statement of probable cause outlined in the search warrant. Prosecutor 1 stated:

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[T]he [probable cause] was basically that Huma Abedin had an email

account. That email account communicated with email accounts where

classified information was there. Classified information made it into

Huma’s email accounts. We believe information from those email

accounts is on this computer belonging to her husband based upon

whatever we could describe about what that agent saw, which we had

to characterize very carefully, and so that what tethered it to the

computer was basically what an agent saw doing a search warrant

from another case. That’s the [probable cause].

We asked Prosecutor 1 if there was any discussion of putting in information relating

to the BlackBerry emails from early in Clinton’s tenure. Prosecutor 1 stated:

I don’t think so. If it would have helped the probable cause, I would

have put it in. I don’t think we had…strong enough basis to do that,

or I would have put it in I’m sure. Because it, I mean we would have,

anything that we could have put in there that was true and would have

bolstered the probable cause, we would have put in.

We also reviewed the factual basis of the October 30 search warrant

application with the NYO case agent for the Weiner investigation. The case agent

told us that each of the facts related to the Weiner laptop that were included in the

search warrant application were known to him “within a day or two” of September

26.

We asked Comey for his reaction to the statement that “[e]very fact in [the

October 30] search warrant was known to the FBI at the highest levels—at least to

the Deputy Director level—on September 28th.” Comey responded, “My reaction is

it likely should have moved faster and I’d want to know, to answer this I’m asking,

but what would their motive be to delay?”

1. Difference in Approach to Devices during Main Investigation

As noted previously, Comey’s decision on October 27 to have the FBI seek a

search warrant for the Weiner laptop generated discussion among the Midyear team

about how that approach differed from the approach that the Midyear team agreed

upon and took during the investigation, namely to only seek Clinton’s personal

electronic devices and not to seek the personal electronic devices of any of her

aides. In addition, in drafting the search warrant application for the Weiner laptop,

a discussion occurred regarding the scope of the requested search warrant and

whether it should be limited to emails between Clinton and Abedin, or whether it

should include all of Abedin’s emails.

Emails from the night of October 29 show that Baker expressed concerns

that the draft search warrant request was too narrow. Specifically, in an email at

9:13 p.m. to FBI Attorney 1, Strzok, and Anderson, Baker stated, “The main

question I [sic] have right now is why we are only seeking access to emails

between Huma and Clinton. Based on the facts set forth about Huma mishandling

classified information on all of her accounts, it seems to me there is [probable

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cause] to look at all of her emails no matter who is the other party. Am I

misreading the scope of the warrant or the strength of the [probable cause]?”

Strzok responded to Baker’s email at 9:28 p.m., stating:

I think the primary deficiency in trying to go after Huma’s own

communications is that Huma’s role and expertise was far more

administrative in nature than that of the other close aides to [Clinton].

That is, when it came to classified information, she was primarily a

conduit to/from others to Clinton, not a generator of such

information/discussion on her own. Whereas Sullivan or Mills had

substantive (and sometimes classified) discussions on their own

absent [Clinton’s] participation, Abedin’s were largely as an

administrative conduit to the Sec’y. Thus, it’s more challenging to

articulate an expectation at the level of [probable cause] that we’d

expect to find classified in her discussions not involving [Clinton]. We

can’t exclude it, but it’s challenging.

FBI Attorney 1 responded to Strzok’s email at 9:55 p.m., stating, “That’s right,

Pete. Plus, we can’t say she mishandled on all of her accounts. Of the 27 classified

emails, 26 were on her @clintonemail.com account and one was Yahoo. We also

cannot say for certain that the 27 classified emails are on this particular device,

which also weakens our argument generally.” In response, Baker sent an email at

10:18 p.m., stating, “There is [probable cause] to believe that Huma used her

email accounts to mishandle classified information. I just don’t understand why

that [i]s not enough to look at all her emails…. Would you please discuss with

DOJ?” Baker told us that he believed the FBI should seek the authority to review

all of Abedin’s emails on the laptop, instead of just emails between Abedin and

Clinton.

FBI Attorney 1 told us that she recalled Baker “wanting the search warrant to

be broader” and in an email on October 29 FBI Attorney 1 stated that Baker’s “point

is there could be relevant emails that are not between Huma and HRC—particularly

regarding intent.” At 11:06 p.m. on October 29, FBI Attorney 1 sent Prosecutor 1

and Prosecutor 2 an email informing them of Baker’s concern and adding, “I

understand that the scope of our consensual searches has been limited to emails

with [Clinton], but the purpose of our investigation was to look for classified

information that transited the server, which would include Huma’s @clintonemail. I

honestly can’t remember how we treated those when we got consent for the second

server, and I don’t [have] the letter in front of me.” Prosecutor 1 responded at

11:12 p.m., “[W]e did not look through all of Huma’s emails before (we searched

for Clinton’s addresses but did not go through all of her emails). We can discuss

but that seems like a pretty big push (we only use examples of comm[uniciation]s

with Clinton [to] establish [probable cause] for 793 offenses).” Five minutes later,

at 11:17 p.m., FBI Attorney 1 responded, “I honestly couldn’t remember how we

treated Huma @clintonemail emails before given [sic]. Sounds like limiting the

search to [Clinton] communications is consistent.”

FBI Attorney 1 told the OIG that the Department “didn’t believe that we had

the [probable cause] to, to be broader than that.” Baker stated that someone at

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either the Department or SDNY “pushed back and said no, we don’t have [probable

cause] for that.”188

We asked the prosecutors about this issue. Prosecutor 1 told us that he felt

“we need[ed] to treat Huma like we treated her earlier on in the investigation.”

Prosecutor 1 told us that it did not make sense to “expand the bounds” of what

they had done before when reviewing the Weiner laptop. Prosecutor 2 also noted

this, stating:

And then there is also the issue of like we didn’t look at everyone’s

emails over the course of this investigation. We had Huma’s, some of

like Huma’s clintonemail.com emails on the server. And we never got

consent or a search warrant to look through Huma’s email on the

server because, you know, the judgment was made that like that was

not so significant to the investigation. So, I think from the DOJ

perspective, we were kind of confused why this was such a significant

development.

During this debate with FBI on October 29, Prosecutor 1 sent an email to

Toscas stating, “Worried that Baker and higher ups over there (or people in the

chain) are going to say DOJ was standing in their way. It just seems to me that

they are pushing the bounds here all of a sudden (when they didn’t do so before).”

We asked Prosecutor 1 about this email. Prosecutor 1 stated that part of his

concern was frustration at the FBI for requesting the search warrant be completed

immediately, yet trying to suggest major changes after it was substantially

completed. Prosecutor 1 stated that he also felt “it didn’t make a lot of sense” for

the purpose of probable cause “to talk about hypothetical conversations that could

have” occurred “in order to expand the bounds of what we’re trying to do with the

search warrant.”189

1. Lynch-Comey Meeting on October 31

On Monday, October 31, Lynch requested a private conversation with Comey

after the regularly scheduled Monday morning meeting between the Department

and the FBI. Yates told us that she and Lynch had talked about this meeting

beforehand and that Lynch told Yates that Lynch planned to make two points to

Comey: (1) the October 28th letter “was a blunder,” and (2) that Comey and the

FBI needed to process the Weiner laptop “as fast as you can.”

188 As noted above, after reviewing a draft of this report, Toscas and others noted that SDNY

played no substantive role in the October 30 search warrant.

189 In comments provided to the OIG after reviewing a draft of this report, Baker stated that

he “had not played a significant role, if any, in scoping the prior consent agreements or legal process

used to obtain other emails in the investigation.” Baker continued, “Given the intense focus on the

Weiner laptop, [Baker said he] looked more closely at this warrant application and asked what [he]

thought were logical questions.” Ultimately, Baker stated that he “deferred to DOJ on whether there

was probable cause to support the seizure of additional emails.”

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We asked Comey about this meeting. Comey stated:

So the two of us went into the AG’s private office…and I went over to

sit in a chair and she closed the door and turned around and started

walking at me with her head down and her arms out and came up to

me because I’m so ridiculously tall and pressed her head, her face

against my solar plexus and wrapped her arms around me and hugged

me and then I kind of awkwardly—I’m not a hugger because I’m a

giraffe—and so I kind of patted the Attorney General’s back and then

the embrace—she broke the embrace and then said, “I just wanted to

give you a hug.”

And she went over and sat down. And then…she said, “How are you

doing?” I said, “I’m doing okay.” I said, “Look this is really bad, but

the alternative is worse.” And then she said, “Yeah would they feel

better if it had leaked on November 6th?” And I just said, “Exactly

Loretta.” Because I hadn’t made the disclosure to Congress because

of the leaks—the prospect of leaks, but it actually consoled me

because really you’re not that important because even if you hadn’t

sent a letter to Congress, which was the right thing to do, it probably

would have leaked anyway that you were going for a search warrant

on this stuff and she obviously saw it the same way and said, “Right,

would they feel better if it had leaked on November 6th?” I think she

said. And I said, “Exactly.”

And then she said a nice thing, “I hope you’re holding up.” And then

she said—so we get up and start walking to the door. She’s in front of

me and then she turns around and says, “Try to look beat up.” And so

then she opens the door, we walk out, her staff is all out in the hallway

and I walk out.

And then somebody puts it out within moments that the Attorney

General had taken me aside to give me a woodshedding or something;

it was in the media, I think, that morning. So she and I never spoke

about that again, but I reasonably understood that. Her saying you

did the right thing, and even if you hadn’t sent the letter, it would

have come out anyway and that would’ve been even worse and so

that’s—I think that’s the end of the story.

We also asked Lynch about this meeting. Lynch told us that the reason she

called the one-on-one meeting with Comey was primarily because she “wanted to

talk to him about” leaks and she was concerned that Comey “didn’t want to talk

about it in front of a larger group.” Lynch stated:

We went into a smaller room…. And I recall, we were both sitting

down. And I recall saying we have to talk about this letter and the

aftermath of it…. I don’t recall my exact words, but I remember

saying, you know, I know that you were aware that I did not think you

should do this. But, it is done now, and we have to deal with the

aftermath of it…. And I said…this has not followed what was at least

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conveyed to me you thought you were going to do. And…I made the

point that it was immediately described as the investigation was

reopened, the full investigation was reopened.

And he said, you know, I was very clear…I was very careful not to say

that. And I had heard over the weekend that he had been surprised or

disappointed, or perhaps both, that the letter was being characterized

in that way. Because that was not what he wanted to say, not what

he intended to say. And I said, I understand that that wasn’t your

intention, but that’s how it was taken…. I said, in many ways, it’s the

exact opposite of what you wanted to have happen. And I said, and I

think it’s caused a huge problem for the Department because we have

this perception now that we are essentially trying to harm one of the

candidates….

And I raised the possibility. I said I think you ought to think about

sending another letter, a clarifying letter. You’ve already done this

now. You have created a misimpression as to what is going on…. You

need to clarify this and say that essentially you want to make it clear

that this is not a reopening of the investigation. That should be

conveyed in there somewhere.

And he said, how would you phrase that? And I said, you know, I

have not put pen to paper. I have not wordsmithed this. And I said,

and I don’t think it should come from me. It needs to come from you

because you gave the initial letter. I said if it comes from me, then we

are essentially talking about internal DOJ fights and disagreements

and everything. And that’s throwing more into the public arena that

shouldn’t be there. He said, I agree with you on that. He said I’ll

think about that. I’ll think about that.

…[A]t some point, I said it’s clear to me that, that we’re going to have

to do some statement at the end of the forensic analysis. It could be

part of that. Or you could do it today. I said, but I really think you

need to clarify this. And he said, I hear you, I hear you. Which is a

phrase that Comey uses a lot, I hear you. And he said, I will give that

a great deal of thought. And he said, my concern is, and again, I don’t

recall the exact words, but he said I have a concern that it would do

more harm than good at this point. And I said, okay, well let’s think

about what it would look like.

The other issue I raised with him was…I said, look, I’ve known you for

a long time. You and I have been in the Department a long time. I

said, my view is you would never have done something like this if you

didn’t feel tremendous pressure to do it. And I said, and I don’t

understand that pressure. I said, but, it was conveyed to me that you

were very concerned about leaks, specifically. And I said, I can only

assume that you were thinking of leaks that would have been of this

information in a much, much worse way. And he said, you’re right.

You’re exactly right about that.

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Now, I knew that the laptop had been handled in a case out of New

York. And so I said, you know, we have to talk about the New York

office…and the concern that both you and I have expressed about

leaks in the past. And I said, do you think that this was the right way

to deal with the issue, the concern about leaks?… He didn’t have

much of a response. But we were having a conversation…. And I

said, you know, I’ve talked, you and I have talked about that before….

[McCabe] and I have talked about them before….

And then I said, now, we’ve got to talk about the New York office in

general. And he said yes. And I said we both work with them. We

both know them. We both, you know, think highly of them. I said,

but this has become a problem. And he said, and he said to me that it

had become clear to him, he didn’t say over the course of what

investigation or whatever, he said it’s clear to me that there is a cadre

of senior people in New York who have a deep and visceral hatred of

Secretary Clinton. And he said it is, it is deep. It’s, and he said, he

said it was surprising to him or stunning to him.

You know, I didn’t get the impression he was agreeing with it at all, by

the way. But he was saying it did exist, and it was hard to manage

because these were agents that were very, very senior, or had even

had timed out and were staying on, and therefore did not really feel

under pressure from headquarters or anything to that effect. And I

said, you know, I’m aware of that…. I said, I wasn’t aware it was to

this level and this depth that you’re talking about, but I said I’m sad to

say that that does not surprise me.

And he made a comment about, you know, you understand that. A lot

of people don’t understand that. You, you get that issue. I said, I get

that issue. I said I’m, I’m just troubled that this issue, meaning the,

the New York agent issue and leaks, I am just troubled that this issue

has put us where we are today with respect to this laptop.

And he said again I hear you, I hear you. I will think about that. I will

consider what to do. He said, but he said again, I’m concerned that

another letter right now that isn’t tied to a resolution of the forensics

would just be pouring more, he didn’t say more fuel on the fire, but

that was the phraseology, something like that that he used. And I

said, all right. I said, well, let me know what you decide about

whether to do something else or not, particularly as we go through the

process of finding things out.

Lynch told us that she was “sure” she “asked [Comey] if he was okay” and that she

may have hugged him because she “often did.” Lynch also stated that as they

departed the room she joked with Comey and said “something like of course you’re

going to look like I beat you up.” Overall, Lynch described the conversation as a

“friendly” but “tough conversation” given the “serious and significant issues”

involved.

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Lynch’s Chief of Staff stated that Lynch told her about the conversation with

Comey afterwards. Lynch’s Chief of Staff stated:

[Lynch] said the Director had expressed that he needed to send the

letter because he was very concerned about leaks, that it was going to

leak out anyway that they had found these emails in relation to the

Weiner investigation. She may have told me something else, but I

don’t remember. I remember that being the big thing that he had

focused on.

We also reviewed McCord’s notes of a meeting she attended with Lynch on

October 31, after Lynch’s meeting with Comey, in which the Midyear investigation

was discussed. The notes reflect that Lynch stated the following:

…good vehicle for more clarifying stmt.

need to correct misimpressions out there

Told Director this morning [and] he wanted to think about it

—could recap where we were at end of last week [and] talk

about process w/out details of what we’re finding

—will cont. our review [and] take approp. inv. steps

—should come from Comey to clarify what he said Friday….

III. FBI Review of Weiner Laptop Emails

Midyear agents obtained a copy of the Weiner laptop from NYO immediately

after the search warrant was signed on October 30. The laptop was taken directly

to Quantico where the FBI’s Operational Technology Division (OTD) began

processing the laptop. The Lead Analyst told us that given the volume of emails on

the laptop and the difficulty with de-duplicating the emails that “at least for the first

few days, the scale of what we’re doing seem[ed] really, really big.” Strzok told us

that OTD was able “to do some amazing things” to “rapidly de-duplicate” the emails

on the laptop, which significantly lowered the number of emails that the Midyear

team would have to individually review. Strzok stated that only after that

technological breakthrough did he begin to think it was “possible we might wrap up

before the election.”

FBI leadership, including Comey, was briefed on an almost daily basis during

the review process. The Lead Analyst told us that he recalled briefing Comey on

Friday, November 4, stating:

I told [Comey], I said…I think there’s a possibility we may be able to

get through this before the end of the weekend. So he said if you

think you can do it, you should try to. So that’s what we did. We

brought in, we basically put all hands on deck for [that Saturday].

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The Midyear team flagged all potentially work-related emails encountered during

the review process and compared those to emails that they had previously reviewed

in other datasets. Any work-related emails that were unique, meaning that they

did not appear in any other dataset, were individually reviewed by the Lead

Analyst, Strzok, and FBI Attorney 1 for evidentiary value.

Analysts on the Midyear team subsequently drafted a document summarizing

the review of the Weiner laptop entitled, “Anthony Weiner Laptop Review for

Communications Pertinent to Midyear Exam.” This document, dated November 15,

2016, showed that the full image of the laptop contained approximately 1,355,980

items, or files. According to the document, FBI OTD initially extracted

approximately 350,000 emails from the laptop and then approximately 344,000

BlackBerry backup files.190 The FBI determined that 4 of the 13 BlackBerry backups

“were assessed to belong to Abedin.” The remaining 9 BlackBerry backups were

associated with Weiner. The FBI only reviewed emails to or from Clinton during the

period in which she was Secretary of State, and not emails from Abedin to other

parties or emails outside that period. Analyst 1 stated, “I had very strict

instructions that all I was allowed to do within the case was look for Hillary Clinton

emails, because that was the scope of our work.” Utilizing various searches

targeting Clinton’s emails, the FBI reviewed in full “approximately 48,982” items on

the Weiner laptop.

The FBI ultimately “identified 13 confirmed classified email chains, the

content of which was duplicative of emails previously recovered during the

investigation.” None of these emails were marked classified, but 4 of the 13 were

classified as Secret at the time sent and 9 were classified Confidential at the time

sent. The FBI determined that Abedin forwarded two of the confirmed classified

emails to Weiner.191 The FBI reviewed 6,827 emails that were either to or from

Clinton and assessed 3,077 of those emails to be “potentially work-related.” The

FBI analysis of the review noted that “[b]ecause metadata was largely absent, the

emails could not be completely, automatically de-duplicated or evaluated against

prior emails recovered during the investigation” and therefore the FBI could not

determine how many of the potentially work-related emails were duplicative of

emails previously obtained in the Midyear investigation.

190 A BlackBerry backup is a file, typically found on a personal computer, containing data from

a BlackBerry handheld device. The BlackBerry backup can include data from the handheld device’s

address book, calendar, browser, email, SMS and MMS messages, phone call logs and history, as well

as pictures and other media stored on the on-board media storage. At the time the backup is created,

the user can configure the specific items to be saved. As a result, not all of the above items may be

found in every backup.

191 The FBI did not determine exactly how Abedin’s emails came to reside on Weiner’s laptop.

Analyst 2 told us that it appeared that Abedin’s personal devices had been backed up on the laptop at

various points in time. Documents we reviewed indicated that Abedin told the FBI that she did not

know how or why this occurred.

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1. Agent 1 Instant Messages from November 1

On November 1, Agent 1 and an FBI agent uninvolved in the Midyear

investigation exchanged the following instant messages on the FBI’s computer

network. The sender of each message is identified after the timestamp.

8:31 a.m., Uninvolved Agent: “A horrible shit sandwich. Still no

[grand jury] I imagine. So, you find Huma lied; BFD. No one at DoJ is

going to prosecute.”

8:33 a.m., Agent 1: “Rog – noone is going to pros[ecute] even if we

find unique classified. [Grand jury] story was inaccurate – 50+ GJ

subpoenas and 2703d issued,”

8:37 a.m., Agent 1: “…We only had several warrants and alot of

consent searches on media. I would have liked to use warrants for all

because the consent agreements had limited scope. Reasonable

scope, but I don’t like to stand on the lawn and have the occupants

throw out the evidence to us.”

We asked Agent 1 about these messages. Agent 1 told us that this was another

example of a friend reaching out to him about the status of the Midyear

investigation. Agent 1 continued:

I think that similar to what I’ve said before, I think this is me venting

or complaining in a vein of, you know, but I have, I have nothing to

substantiate. I don’t have a statement. I don’t have a, I don’t have

an action that someone wouldn’t prosecute it if, if we found it.

We asked Agent 1 about his expectation at the time of what would be found on the

Weiner laptop and how that could impact the Midyear investigation. Agent 1

stated:

I think my feeling at the time was there was a really good chance we’d

find emails we hadn’t seen before…. That there might not be

something that could potentially be classified…but…would it be so

much different than what we had already seen? I, my impression

would probably be no.

1. Comey Letter to Congress on November 6

On the afternoon of November 3, the FBI began drafting what ultimately

became Comey’s letter to Congress announcing that the FBI had completed its

review of the emails to or from Clinton that were on the Weiner laptop. That work

was completed very early on November 6. Later that same day, Comey sent his

second letter to Congress, which we provide as Attachment F. This letter stated:

I write to supplement my October 28, 2016 letter that notified you the

FBI would be taking additional investigative steps with respect to

former Secretary of State Clinton’s use of a personal email server.

Since my letter, the FBI investigative team has been working around

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the clock to process and review a large

the clock to process and review a large volume of emails from a device

obtained in connection with an unrelated criminal investigation.

During that process, we reviewed all of the communications that were

to or from Hillary Clinton while she was Secretary of State.

Based on our review, we have not changed our conclusions that we

expressed in July with respect to Secretary Clinton.

I am very grateful to the professionals at the FBI for doing an

extraordinary amount of high-quality work in a short period of time.

Comey told us that he met with the Midyear team after they had finished the

review of the emails on the Weiner laptop and “went through what they had done,

what they had found, and their conclusion was, it does not change our view with

respect to Hillary Clinton.” Comey stated that there was “more work to be done

with respect to” Abedin and Weiner to understand how the emails ended up on

Weiner’s computer, but that the review was complete with respect to Clinton.

Comey continued, “And then I said, okay, you know, basically convince me you’ve

done it well.” Once convinced, Comey stated, “I said, okay now we’re done, we

should notify Congress that we are done. And then we set to work on that.”

Comey stated that Steinbach opposed the idea of a second letter. Comey

explained:

And [Steinbach’s] view was, I just think it’s too late that, as I recall

it…but that we’ve created a storm and if you try to undo the storm

now, you’ll simply feed the storm more or something—so words to that

effect. I said, look I respect that view, but I think you’re wrong. I

think having spoken, that led to us having to speak, having spoken we

need to, in fairness, say that we’re done. You’ve done it well, you’ve

been able to do it in time. So then we shared that also with DOJ, got

feedback and then sent that letter. And again the goal there was to be

as fair as possible while still accomplishing the goal of telling them that

we’ve finished with respect to her.

Steinbach told us that he could not recall the specifics of the debate about the

November 6 letter, but stated, “I think maybe the November 6th one I was thinking

look, it’s already done. Just let it, let it go, let it die. I can’t remember.”

The Lead Analyst told us that he raised objections to the November 6 letter

during discussions with Comey. The Lead Analyst stated:

I said I, I could understand the first statement because we were

reopening an investigation. We were correcting the record. But I said

I don’t agree that, that this time we have any obligation to do that

because the investigation isn’t done. We have additional investigative

steps that are going to happen. We’re not closed in the sense of being

closed. We may have, we may have come to a, a position of

understanding about what’s on this laptop. But to me, that same

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obligation, which is to me what drove us to make the first statement,

does not exist now.

The Lead Analyst told us that the further investigative steps needed to complete the

investigation included at least a “malware analysis” to examine the laptop for

intrusion and a re-interview of Abedin. Abedin was in fact re-interviewed by the

FBI on January 6, 2017. With regard to the malware analysis, the Lead Analyst

explained:

[T]he way I explain this in my thinking is, again, from my

[counterintelligence] perspective, one of the key questions you’re

trying to answer to any of these circumstances, especially when you’ve

been confirmed that classified information is resident on a device that

it shouldn’t be, is did that device get compromised by anyone. That’s

a part of the equation of was this of significant or negative impact to

U.S. national security. If it’s simply on Weiner’s laptop and that’s

where it ended, then that’s one thing. It’s another thing if through

this, their actions that got on Weiner’s laptop and a foreign power

obtained those classified, that’s a separate question. So to me that’s

not a, that’s not an insignificant aspect of this that was still completely

unresolved at the time.

The Lead Analyst stated, “Then ultimately, the Director looked at me, and…he

thanked me and thanked everybody for our candor, as always. And he said, but I

have decided we’re going to do it. And we’re going to make it, you know, the

statement and, that’s kind of it.”

At 7:52 p.m. on November 5, Page sent a text message to Strzok that

stated, “I don’t want to make a statement anymore.” Strzok responded at 7:58

p.m., stating, in part, “Yeah I don’t either. We’re kind of out of the news cycle,

let’s leave it that way.” At 8:11 a.m. on November 6, Page sent another text

message to Strzok that stated, “I still don’t know that we should make this

statement.” Strzok immediately responded, “I don’t either. Imsg?”

After being shown these text messages, Strzok stated that he thought the

decision to send the November 6 letter was “easier” then the decision about the

October 28 letter. However, Strzok stated that he was concerned that every time

the FBI acted it “invigorate[d] the news cycle.” We also asked Strzok and Page

about their use of iMessage, a built-in instant message service on Apple devices.

As described in more detail in Chapter Twelve, Strzok and Page told us that they

mostly used iMessage and personal email for personal use. However, Strzok told us

could not exclude the possibility that he sent work-related information over

iMessage. Similarly, Page told us that references to these other forums reflected

“mostly personal use” as opposed to using them for work purposes. However, she

stated that she and Strzok sometimes used these forums for work-related

discussions due to the technical limitations of FBI-issued phones.

Unlike the October 28 letter, the FBI sent a draft copy of the November 6

letter to the Department and the Department participated meaningfully in the

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drafting process. Axelrod stated that he “insisted” upon seeing the letter and he,

along with Toscas and Associate Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools, provided

comments and edits.