This article is republished with permission from our friends at The Daily Signal.

Commentary By Dean Cheng

Chinese airmen parade during a full honors arrival ceremony at the ministry of defense headquarters in Beijing, China. DoD photo by Linda D. Kozaryn

 In a move that will make the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) a more competitive and capable force for any future conflict contingency, Chinese leader Xi Jinping today announced the reorganization of the major Chinese military commands. From seven “military regions (junqu),” the PLA will now move to five “major war zones (da zhanqu),” or five theaters. There will now be Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, and Middle or Central theaters.

The Central Military Commission is now responsible for overall management of the PLA, hence the fifteen departments, commissions, and offices. Actual conduct of military operations, however, will be the responsibility of these five new theaters. The services, meanwhile, will be responsible for “army-building”; this will, in some ways, parallel the American concept whereby the Combatant Commands (e.g., CENTCOM, PACOM) are responsible for wartime operations, while the services train and equip the forces.

These major reforms reflect movement in each area. The overhaul of the senior administration of the PLA from four “general departments” to fifteen departments, commissions, and offices is supposed to allow greater bureaucratic efficiency (and likely is also a move to reduce corruption, a major target of Xi’s ire for the past several years).

The new theater commands will facilitate more joint operations, a longstanding Chinese effort that has been underway since the late 1990s. Moreover, unlike the initial push for jointness, there is now a recognition that joint headquarters cannot be ad hoc, but must be established on a permanent basis. The joint campaign command headquarters, previously to be established only in wartime, will now be the basis for these new theater commands.

These new commands are likely to accord much greater roles to the non-ground force services. In particular, the establishment of the Strategic Support Force, one of the three new services announced on Dec. 31, is likely to have a major impact on the organization of these new theater commands. The Strategic Support Force is essentially responsible for establishing information dominance, as it controls space and cyber combat forces.

Given the Chinese emphasis on being able to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions,” this service is likely to be of paramount importance in each theater’s war planning.

What remains to be seen is their areas of responsibility. To what extent, for example, will they be planning increasingly expeditionary operations? How far from China’s shores will these theater commands extend?

Dean Cheng

Dean Cheng brings detailed knowledge of China’s military and space capabilities to bear as The Heritage Foundation’s research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. Read his research.